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Abstract: 
The existence of role conflict among organizational members tends to create tensions inside 
organizations worldwide. However, in the context of family firms, having a dual role of being a 
member of a family and a member of the firm can represent interesting differences that make 
family firms an important form of organization to study. Following the tenets of the stewardship 
theory, our article develops a model where reciprocal altruism represents an antecedent to role 
conflict among family members. We further argue that perceptions of collective efficacy among 
family members have a moderating effect on the relationship between reciprocal altruism and 
role conflict. Last, we propose that role conflict in family firms reduces the family firm 
performance. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. 
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Article: 
Family-owned and/or -managed businesses dominate the economic landscape worldwide (Morck 
& Yeung, 2004). Yet, little is known about the particular challenge that family firms encounter 
due to the distinctive nature of role conflict among family members who work in the 
organization. Family members are faced with multiple roles and activities that emerge from 
acting as members of the family and members of the family business (e.g., Gersick, Davis, 
Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997; Katz & Kahn, 1978), resulting in role conflict (for recent meta-
analyses, see Schmidt, Roesler, Kusserow, & Rau, in press; Tubre & Collins, 2000). 
Role conflict is defined as “the degree of incongruity or incompatibility of expectations 
associated with the role” (Croci, Doukas, & Gonenc, 2011, p. 474). Role conflict occurs when at 
least one role expectation is incompatible with at least one other (Beehr, Drexler, & 
Faulkner, 1997). Fulfilling the demands of one role might undermine the second role and the 
tension associated with one role can extend into the other one (Stoner, Hartman, & Arora, 1990). 
For family firms, managing role conflict among the working family members is critical because 
of the dual roles of being a family member and a family business employee (e.g., Barton & 
Gordon, 1988). In addition to highlighting the importance of role conflict in family firms, we 
explore how reciprocal altruism affects role conflict among family members (e.g., Eddleston & 
Kellermanns, 2007). Indeed, the nature of family members’ role conflict working in the family 
business is expected to be different from role conflict among employees in nonfamily firms 
owing to the unique mix between the family, the business, and idiosyncrasies such as reciprocal 
altruism that are rooted in the family, but affect the family firm behaviour as well. 
In order to address the gap in the literature, we develop a theoretical framework that highlights 
the role conflicts that emerge among family members working for the family firm. 1 Our model 
draws on stewardship theory as this theory deals with the sociopsychological factors that 
determine members’ intentions and behaviours in the family business (Davis, Allen, & 
Hayes, 2010; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Moreover, the stewardship perspective is 
useful in the family firm context because family members place high value on the attainment of 
the goals of the family business (e.g., Davis et al., 1997, 2010). Our theoretical framework is 
driven by two research questions: (1) What factors mitigate/elevate role conflict in family firms? 
and (2) How does family business members’ role conflict impact firm performance? 
Our theoretical development implies that family and nonfamily firms differ in role conflicts due 
to the duality of family members’ roles (Gersick et al., 1997), family firm-specific 
psychodynamic effects, such as marital discord (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001), 
high levels of dependence on human and social capital that are family business employees with 
kinship ties and family's social networks (e.g., Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007), long-term 
orientation (e.g., Zellweger, 2007), and, ultimately, transgenerational sustainability (Kotlar & De 
Massis, 2013; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). We suggest that reciprocal 
altruism in family firms represents an integrative mechanism reducing role conflict in these types 
of businesses. Particularly, this relationship is moderated by perceptions of collective efficacy 
(Bandura, 2000), such as shared belief in the family's capabilities to attain family business goals. 
Studies suggest that a strong sense of collective efficacy can facilitate a positive interpersonal 
climate, greater cooperation, and helping behaviour among group members. These characteristics 
are consistent with family members engaging in stewardship behaviour. Indeed, Chen and Bliese 
(2002) also suggest that perceptions of collective efficacy can act as a buffer in mitigating 
negative effects of work stressors on group members’ psychological well-being. Finally, our 
model suggests that if role conflict exists in family firms, the firm performance will be 
negatively affected. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Stewardship theory and the family firm 
Stewardship theory examines relationships in organizations where members have a collectivist 
orientation and are aligned with the interests of the organization (Davis et al., 1997, 2010). It is 
built on a different set of assumptions for predicting managers’ (referred to as stewards) 
motivations towards goal attainment (Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang, 2007) that 
departs from agency theory, the dominant theoretical perspective, which suggests conflicts 
between the interests of the owner (principal) and the manager (agent) (for a review of agency 
theory, see Eisenhardt, 1989). Indeed, it is the focus on the intrinsic motivation of the manager 
that tries to further the common good, which represents the key distinction between stewardship 
and other theoretical perspectives (Davis et al.,1997). 
Davis et al. (1997) argue that motivation, identification, and use of power are the key 
psychological elements influencing the relationships among stewards. Intrinsic rewards, such as 
career growth, achievement, self-actualization, affiliation, etc., motivate family business 
members to put their individual objectives aside and work towards attaining the goals of the 
family business (e.g., Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Family business members also identify 
themselves with their organization by accepting the family firm mission and objectives and 
choose to behave in congruence with their family firm identity (Zellweger, Eddleston, & 
Kellermanns, 2010). Stewards, who do not have to be the owners of family firms (e.g., relatives 
of the owner employed by the family business), may develop a sense of psychological ownership 
and behave as quasi-owners of the family firm. Furthermore, the use of personal power deriving 
from family business members’ personalistic and particularistic tendencies, which can fully 
develop in family firms (Carney, 2005), can facilitate stewardship behaviours in family firms. 
In our article, we see stewardship behaviour, reflected by reciprocal altruism, as a key element to 
reduce the occurrence of role conflict in family firms. We present our theoretical model in Figure 
1. First, we suggest that reciprocal altruism is a family firm specific determinant of role conflict 
among family business members. In the absence of a clear strategy and structure that is furthered 
by reciprocal altruism, family members can deviate from a stewardship behaviour due to lack of 
clear collective goals fostering self-centredness, individualistic goals, and behaviours. As such, 
the perceptions of employees affect the attitudinal and behavioural outcomes in family firms 
(e.g., Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006). Our model also explores the moderating role of family 
members’ perceptions of collective efficacy (e.g., Bandura, 2000) on the relationships between 
(1) reciprocal altruism and (2) family members' role conflict. Last, we propose a link between 
levels of role conflict and performance. 
Role conflict 
Role conflict has been investigated in various academic disciplines (Schmidt et al., in press). 
Because organizations are “open systems of roles” where individuals play their parts with their 
interdependent behaviours in the formation of a social system (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 172), the 
potential for organizational members to experience role conflict is highly dependent on the 
expectations about the occurrence and/or compliance with two or more roles (e.g., House & 
Rizzo, 1972; Katz & Kahn, 1978). Particularly, role conflicts emerge when individuals cannot 
fulfil the demands of one role without stepping over a second or third role (Stoner et al., 1990). 
From the social exchange perspective (Shore & Barksdale, 1998; Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997), 
role conflict represents a prevalent challenge in organizations as it can create imbalance in the 
employee–employer relationship. Researchers have focused on the individual outcomes of role 
conflict such as intensified internal conflicts, anxiety, higher tension related to the job, lower job 
satisfaction and job involvement, less confidence in supervisors and in the organization, 
propensity to leave an organization, absenteeism, work–family conflict, and lower commitment 
to the organization (e.g., Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000; Tubre & Collins, 2000). Hence, role 
conflict is not only a micro-level personal matter, but also an interpersonal issue leading to 
macro-level organizational consequences, such as low performance, depression, and higher 
turnover (e.g., Good, Sisler, & Gentry, 1998; Schmidt et al., in press) that are costly to 
organizations. 
Role conflict within the context of family firms 
Unlike employees in nonfamily firms, family members who work in the family firm have the 
dual role of being a family member and a family firm employee, complicating the 
responsibilities of fulfilling both family and business expectations (Gersick et al., 1997). Due to 
the interface between the family and the business (Arregle et al., 2007), the potential for 
generating role conflicts within family members tends to have a direct influence on the family 
business, as expectations and behaviours cannot be separated so easily. 
Indeed, the individual's social identity, such as being a family member and a family employee, 
can impose an inconsistent and complex array of demands upon the person (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989). This is particularly challenging for family members as roles become more complex 
when they require an individual to be simultaneously involved in at least two subsystems (Katz 
& Kahn, 1978). Thereby, the expectations of family and business subsystems are combined to 
become the role of the family business member who will have a hard time to set his/her own 
priorities. If role pressures from work or from the family are incompatible, fulfilling both role 
expectations becomes an impossible task (Stoner et al., 1990). For example, if the parent-
manager promotes an unqualified child, he/she meets the demands of a familial role by caring for 
the offspring; however, he/she is at conflict with the managerial role that requires an objective 
evaluation and judgement and would prohibit the display of nepotism in the business (e.g., 
Jaskiewicz, Uhlenbruck, Balkin, & Reay, 2013; Kidwell, Kellermanns, & Eddleston, 2012). In 
addition, such actions may also generate a set of unintended consequences that can negatively 
affect other organizational members (Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007; Wayne et al., 1997). 
In sum, there is a higher potential for role conflict in family firms than in nonfamily firms due to 
the dual roles of family members of being a member of the family and working for the business. 
In the next section, we focus our attention to the situations that can mitigate and/or elevate role 
conflict in family firms and the family firms’ performance implications. For our theoretical 
development, we rely on stewardship theory for three reasons: (1) sociopsychological factors 
play an important role in shaping the managers’ dedication (Davis et al., 1997, 2010), (2) family 
business members are more dedicated to achieving firm goals than achieving personal goals 
(Chrisman et al.,2007), and (3) the perspective provides specific elements for family firms to 
manage the family members’ relationships (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). 
Reciprocal altruism 
Altruism is “a moral value that motivates individuals to undertake actions that benefit others 
without any expectation of external award” (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002, p. 252). The 
literature on altruism is rooted in a variety of fields and multiple subdimensions have been 
developed (for a comprehensive typology of altruism in family firms, see Lubatkin, Durand, & 
Ling, 2007). For the purpose of the article, we focus on reciprocal altruism, which is defined as 
the exchange of goods and services that are costly acts between individuals such that one 
individual benefits from an act of the other, and then the other individual benefits in return 
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2002). Although the notion of reciprocal altruism has been expanded to 
family-oriented and paternalistic forms (see Lubatkin et al., 2007), the dominant 
conceptualization of reciprocal altruism assumes that family members work towards the greater 
good of the organization (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). 
Indeed, reciprocal altruism can be regarded from a social exchange perspective in which both 
parties reap the rewards of their mutually beneficial exchange relationship. For example, there is 
a sense of trustworthiness generated from parents’ belief that their offspring will not betray them 
(Weibel, 2007). Accordingly, reciprocal altruism is often associated (although not synonymous) 
with stewardship behaviours, as governance inefficiencies are more prone to develop in case of 
asymmetrical altruism, where one party acts opportunistically (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; 
Schulze et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, reciprocal altruism can be facilitated by a successful transfer of norms and values 
by the parents to the offspring, which can lead to a strengthening of family ties and promotes 
reciprocity among family members (Lubatkin et al., 2007). When family business members 
behave in a reciprocal altruistic way (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009), their interests tend to be 
aligned with the interests of the family firm (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Those family business 
members tend to hold business objectives above their personal objectives (Zahra, 2003). When 
there is a sense of trust in the exchanges among the family members, this can reduce the need for 
engaging in controls and formalization that tend to occur in nonfamily firms (e.g., Mellewigt et 
al., 2007; Weibel, 2007). In that regard, following the stewardship perspective, reciprocal 
altruism facilitates bonding through trust, communication, respect, and love (Lubatkin, Schulze, 
Ling, & Dino, 2005) and thus fosters collectivistic behaviours in family firms (Corbetta & 
Salvato, 2004), which can turn short-term goals into long-term outcomes (Eddleston, 
Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008). However, not all family relations can generate positive 
outcomes as problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, or nepotism providing a wide range of 
scenarios for generating role conflicts among family members (e.g., Jaskiewicz et al., 2013; 
Kidwell et al., 2012). 
Thus, with family firms that are characterized by stewardship tendencies, reciprocal altruism 
enhances collectivity in family firms (Karra, Tracey, & Phillips, 2006) by “increasing 
communication and cooperation, and thereby reducing information asymmetries” (Schulze et 
al., 2002, p. 253). Pro-organizational individuals place objectives of the collective higher than 
their personal goals, value long-term relationships and harmony, and avoid conflict and 
confrontations via direct communication (Davis et al., 1997). When communication channels are 
open and information asymmetries are lowered (Davis et al., 1997), individual roles are expected 
to be clearer for family business members and unrealistic role expectations can be prevented or 
reconciled with open communication. Therefore, reciprocal altruism can reduce role conflict 
among family members. Consequently, 
Proposition 1: Reciprocal altruism is negatively associated with role conflict among family 
members working at family firms. 
Collective efficacy as a moderator 
Collective efficacy is a group's shared belief in its group capabilities to organize and execute 
actions necessary for attainment (Bandura, 1997). Self-efficacy affects individuals’ choice of 
settings, activities, skill acquisition, effort levels, taking the initiative, and persistence in coping 
with challenges and stressful situations (e.g., Bandura, 1982). At the individual level, self-
efficacy is “believing in one's capability to perform a task”, influencing one's levels of “task 
effort, persistence toward challenges, expressed interest, and the degree of preferred goal 
difficulty” (Gist,1987, p. 472). In that regard, individuals with high levels of self-efficacy define 
their roles differently because of their different beliefs about personal competencies and 
proactively define situations themselves even though their roles in organizations might be 
prescribed (Jones, 1986). At the group level, Bandura (2000) considers two particular methods of 
measuring collective self-efficacy: Either each individual will add his/her personal capability to 
the entire group or the entire group is assessed as a whole. Studies generally treat collective 
efficacy as the aggregate of individual efficacy (e.g., Jex & Bliese, 1999). Accordingly, 
empirical results highlight the importance of collective efficacy in predicting motivation and 
performance and moderating the impact of work-related stressors on strains (Jex & Bliese,1999). 
In family firms, collective efficacy is a critical element of “intrinsic motivation” within the 
stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997). Perceptions of collective efficacy may be particularly 
important in family firms, as it is a source of encouragement and support (Chang, Memili, 
Chrisman, Kellermanns, & Chua, 2009; Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). Indeed, the family's 
financial and emotional support can elevate persistence and helps the family business members 
overcome obstacles. Higher levels of perceptions of collective efficacy among family members 
are expected to strengthen the mitigating effects of reciprocal altruism on role conflict through 
family members’ proactively extending efforts and activities beyond their self-interests towards 
the achievement of the family business goals. A strong sense of collective efficacy can facilitate 
greater attention and effort to the demands of the situation. Family members’ perceptions of 
collective efficacy will strengthen the relationship between reciprocal altruism and role conflict 
through managing and suppressing (e.g., Taylor & Bryant, 2007) their negative thoughts and 
emotions related with their personal role conflict for the sake of the common good. 
Conversely, perceptions of low collective efficacy can elevate stress levels and impair 
performance by diverting attention from how to best proceed to concerns over failings and 
mishaps and ceasing effort (Jex & Bliese, 1999). Indeed, family members with low perceptions 
of collective efficacy will not benefit from reciprocally altruistic family firm environments that 
have the tendency to reduce role ambiguities and conflict (Eddleston et al., 2008). Their 
behaviour will likely be more passive during challenging situations and diminish the ability to 
benefit from reciprocal altruism. 
Accordingly, we argue that perceptions of collective efficacy can strengthen the negative 
relationship between reciprocal altruism and role conflict as it facilitates a focus on overall goals 
and reduces the perceived conflicting demands on the individual. Therefore, the interaction 
effects of role conflict and perceptions of collective efficacy will be stronger in diminishing role 
conflict than the independent effects of reciprocal altruism on role conflict. Formally stated: 
Proposition 2: The negative relationship between reciprocal altruism and role conflict in family 
firms will be moderated by the perceptions of collective efficacy of family members working at 
family firms. Specifically, higher levels of perceptions of collective efficacy will strengthen the 
negative relationship between reciprocal altruism and role conflict. 
Role conflict and family firm performance 
Last, we need to address the performance implications of role conflict in family businesses. In a 
recent study, Kotlar and DeMassis (2013) observed that family members may have divergences 
in setting goals, especially in cases when intrafamily succession is imminent, that may later 
generate social interaction processes where family members need to bargain towards collective 
agreements to avoid potential conflicts. Nonfamily firm-based studies (e.g., Matthews, Bulger, & 
Barnes-Farrell, 2010; Peterson et al., 1995) have associated role conflict with important 
organizational outcomes, such as low performance, through elevating negative feelings such as 
frustration, irritation, resentment, and worry. Hence, role conflict can interfere with work by 
diverging effort from work to coping with role conflict. This problem may be particularly acute 
in small- to medium-sized family firms where firm performance primarily depends on the 
contributions of family members. If family members involved in the business cannot resolve or 
cope with their role conflict, they may not be able to focus on the attainment of family firm goals 
and are likely to underperform. Furthermore, the performance of the family firm will suffer 
because of the tradeoffs between family-centred and business-centred goals (e.g., Chrisman, 
Memili, & Misra, 2014; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013) which will make family members set 
priorities and make compromises if divergences become unsolved. This can consequently harm 
family firm performance, particularly when the family business relies on a relatively small labour 
pool primarily composed of family members. Hence, we expect that: 
Proposition 3: Role conflict among family members working at the family firm is negatively 
associated with family firm performance. 
 
Figure 1. Family members' role conflict in family firms. 
DISCUSSION 
A study conducted in 21 countries shows that role conflict experiences in work environments are 
widespread worldwide (Peterson et al., 1995). In spite of these findings, role conflict in family 
firms, which are the most predominant organizational form worldwide, remains an 
underresearched area that requires attention. Researchers need to understand the importance that 
role conflict has on family business members and the implications it has for the family firm. 
We offer several contributions to the study of role conflict in family firms. First, family business 
members’ role conflict differs from that of employees in nonfamily firms due to duality of roles, 
heavy influence of family firm-specific sociopsychological factors, and high levels of reliance on 
family members’ human and social capital to achieve a competitive advantage and ensure the 
long-term survival of the firm. This is not to say that nonfamily firm members cannot experience 
role conflict (e.g., Floyd & Lane, 2000). However, role conflict among family members has 
added levels of complexity. Second, we argue that reciprocal altruism mitigates role conflict and 
that role conflict is negatively related to performance in family firms. Third, we explain how 
family members’ perceptions of collective efficacy moderate the relationship between reciprocal 
altruism and role conflict. Finally, our article is one of the first attempts in the family firm 
literature to explore family business members’ role conflict. 
However, it is important to note that although role conflict in family firms is likely to occur more 
often and is more complex, it does not automatically suggest that the overall performance of 
family firms is going to be inferior to nonfamily firms. Indeed, family firm-specific influences, 
often referred to as familiness (e.g., Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003; Zellweger et 
al., 2010), can have both positive and negative effects on performance. Accordingly, family firm 
researchers need to have a better understanding of the nature of family influence as a dual edge 
sword to arrive at a better understanding of family firm performance and the potential 
performance differences between family and nonfamily firms. 
Limitations and future research 
We also need to mention a few limitations of our article that can be addressed in future research. 
The proposed relationships should particularly apply to smaller family firms with a larger degree 
of family involvement. However, family firms often also employ nonfamily employees who have 
their own complex roles and perceptions due to functioning in “a complex environment in family 
firms” (Sharma, 2004, p. 23). In many cases, nonfamily employees may form a larger portion of 
total employees than family members. Therefore, role conflict studies focusing on nonfamily 
employees in family firms would be complementing this article's contributions to the literature. 
It is also important to highlight that family firms are heterogeneous based on strategic 
orientations (Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2005), family business life-cycles (Gersick et al., 1997), 
noneconomic goals (Chrisman et al., 2014), internal factors such as size, generation in charge, 
and industry conditions. In addition, the social processes among family members may vary and 
be affected by several factors such as personality traits (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991), 
perceptions of trust, controls, and behaviours (e.g., Mellewigt et al., 2007; Weibel, 2007), and 
social interactions (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013). These idiosyncrasies of family firms, their 
members, and their teamwork might affect the development and consequences of role conflict 
among family members. Our model specifically focused on family firm performance as the 
outcome variable. However, there may be additional outcome variables to consider (for an 
overview, see Yu, Lumpkin, Brigham, & Sorenson, 2012), which would also likely be negatively 
affected by role conflict experienced by family business members. For example, future research 
could investigate the interplay of personality and cohesion (for a nonfamily firm example, see 
Van Vianen & De Dreu, 2001) paired with the interplay of family firm-specific influences on 
family members’ role conflict on both economic and noneconomic performance, e.g., anxiety 
and depression (for a recent meta-analysis, see Schmidt et al., in press). Furthermore, cross-level 
effects on the proposed relationships (e.g., company structure, industry, or cultural effects) as 
well as related constructs to role conflict, like role overload (e.g., Tordera, González-Romá, & 
Peiró, 2008) could be investigated. 
Our model focused on family members working in the family business. As we acknowledged 
early in the article, family members not working in the business may also experience role 
conflict (e.g., demands of the family business they are not employed in and their regular career 
demands). Research has looked at role salience in family firms (Barnett, Eddleston, & 
Kellermanns, 2009), but strains and their effects on family members not working in the firm due 
to role conflict or other causes are underresearched areas. In addition, how these strains affect 
other family members who work for the family firm also needs to be investigated. 
Our model can also provide avenues for future empirical testing. On one side, prior research has 
established scales for reciprocal altruism and firm performance to use in the context of the family 
firm (Eddleston et al., 2008). In addition, researchers can adapt established scales for role 
conflict (Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970) and collective efficacy (Chen & Bliese, 2002). Also, a 
recent overview of scales utilized in family firm research by Pearson and Carr (2014) may serve 
as a valuable resource for future research. 
Even though we limited our attention on reciprocal altruism, it is important to consider 
alternative scenarios for mitigating and/or elevating role conflict given the other types of 
altruism, particularly parental altruism (Lubatkin et al., 2007). While we focused on all family 
members, the specific effects of the different types of parental altruism paired with the respective 
reciprocal or asymmetrical response from the offspring on role conflict are worthy of further 
investigation. Future research may want to test this assumption and show if altruism among 
family members can be influenced. Indeed, this and other studies have suggested that reciprocal 
altruism among family members is highly beneficial in family firms, and accordingly factors that 
could create this desirable form of altruism over time should be identified. 
Moreover, based on stewardship theory, this article generally views the family firm members as 
stewards (Davis et al.,1997, 2010) whose interests are aligned with the interests of the family 
firm and family business objectives are held above personal objectives (Corbetta & 
Salvato, 2004). However, as Karra et al. (2006) point out, stewardship behaviours in some family 
firms may give way to agency behaviours over time. As the family business becomes successful 
and well-established, complacency might set in and some family members may start free riding 
and shirking (Kidwell et al., 2012). Accordingly, family members’ role conflict may increase and 
become sustained in a family firm environment dominated by agency behaviours. Longitudinal 
studies or a qualitative approach that can capture these types of different developments at various 
stages of the family firm life cycles will be highly desirable. 
In addition, the relationship between role conflict and other types of conflict (for an overview, 
see McKee, Madden, Kellermanns, & Eddleston, 2014) deserves further investigation. One may 
expect that role conflict may have differential impacts on relational, task, and process conflict. 
Hence, future research should investigate if role conflict can trigger the occurrence of these 
conflicts. At the same time, these types of conflict may also serve as a trigger of role conflict. 
For example, existing relationship conflict may further highlight the duality of the family and 
family business roles that each family member has to live up to. Thus, longitudinal studies that 
investigate the interplay between conflict and role conflict are highly desirable. 
Future research can also explore how role conflict among family members might affect social 
identification in family firms. Although social identity theory has applied the notion of role 
conflict in nonfamily firms, family business studies still lack this integration (for exceptions, see 
Zellweger et al., 2010). Hence, we do not know whether role conflict affects social identification 
differently in family firms compared to nonfamily firms. 
We have proposed a parsimonious model to highlight the complexities of role conflict in family 
firms. However, future research may want to expand on the family firm-specific antecedents of 
role conflict that might reduce the likelihood for role conflict to occur in family firms. For 
example, family adaptability and family cohesion could be an interesting antecedent of role 
conflict in family firms. Furthermore, the complexity of the family, e.g., number of family 
members and generations, as well as the ownership structure could be useful extensions. 
Last, family business members’ role conflict might vary in different cultural settings. Future 
research can explore how family business members’ role conflict is affected by dimensions of 
culture that are power distance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, 
uncertainty avoidance, and long-term versus short-term orientation (Hofstede, 2001). For 
example, one can expect higher levels of family business members’ role conflict in large power 
distance societies because of greater inequalities in family and work environments 
(Hofstede, 1994). 
Implications for practice 
Aside from the theoretical contributions and future research directions, we provide the following 
practical implications for managing role conflict in family firms. 
First, family firms represent arenas for understanding how organizations can minimize role 
conflict that emerges among organizational members. Particularly, when families are strong and 
cohesive towards attaining goals and setting strategic directions for the future, its members can 
understand their organizational position as well as their expectations to perform and behave. This 
is important, because failing to reduce role conflicts can imply work dissatisfaction, and 
potentially accelerate turnover intentions and negative performance consequences. Engaging in 
stewardship behaviour can enable organizational members to become more focused on valuing 
their activities and reduce their conflicts because of kinship ties and altruism. 
Although the distinctiveness of being a family business member can generate additional layers of 
complexity when analysing role conflict, role conflict should be manageable if the business 
generates participation among its members. This will facilitate the family members’ ability to 
manage the expectations that emerge from their multiple roles. Particularly, as the family pursues 
the vision of retaining the business under family control, it can be expected that shared values 
and group cohesiveness generated from reciprocal altruism can enable the reduction of role 
conflicts among family members. 
In conclusion, theory and practice can benefit from our conceptual framework with a better 
understanding of family members’ role conflict in family firms. Because of the complexity of 
being a family member, understanding of the nature, consequences, and determinants of family 
members’ role conflict is critical in retention and career development of family business 
members who play a key role in transgenerational survival and success in family firms. 
Notes 
1 Family members not working in the family firm are also exposed to role conflict. This group of 
family members, however, is beyond the scope of our article. 
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